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Moving engagement “upstream”? Nanotechnologies
and the Royal Society and Royal Academy of
Engineering’s inquiry
Tee Rogers-Hayden and Nick Pidgeon
In response to the impetus that is gathering in the UK for upstream public
engagement, we analyze the impacts of the Royal Society and Royal Academy
of Engineering report of 2004 on Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Oppor-
tunities and Uncertainties. The paper presents an analysis of 24 interviews
with stakeholders to the nanotechnology debate. It uses these to discuss the
inquiry process and the recommendations contained within the report, as well
as to explore and critique the notion of “upstream.” We find broad support for
the inquiry, which was positioned by many stakeholders itself as upstream,
primarily because of its broad framing and wide stakeholder involvement. A
number of both explicit and implicit upstream elements are also contained
within its recommendations. However, the interviews also suggest that the
notion of upstream engagement is a contested concept with a range of associ-
ated dilemmas and tensions. In drawing out some of the promise and perils of
moving public debate upstream, the paper concludes that there is a risk of
merely replacing the perceived deficit in public understanding of science with
a perceived deficit in public engagement with science.
1. Introduction
There is considerable emphasis today in the UK being placed upon stakeholder and public
dialogue1 in relation to science and technology issues. Such processes have in many respects
overtaken attempts to promote increased public understanding of science and greater science
literacy through more traditional science communication methods. However, a valid criticism
of much public engagement2 is that it often only occurs after a controversial social or ethical
question has arisen in relation to a new technology. And this may be only quite late in the
research, development and application cycle. Under such circumstances public engagement
may well, intentionally or unintentionally, serve only token purposes, especially so if the
engagement comes too late to influence significant decisions or applications that are locked
in by commercial or other constraints.
The notion of promoting engagement early for emerging technology has been gaining
support, amongst not only civil society groups and the science policy communities (e.g.
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Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004; Wilsdon
et al., 2005; Macnaghten et al., 2005) but also, perhaps most significantly, some sectors of the
UK government (HM Treasury et al., 2004). It involves consideration of a technology, and
any potential social and ethical issues, before significant research and development decisions
are made and become locked in. There are clearly benefits to enabling public engagement at
such an early stage of any emerging technology’s life cycle. Most important of these is the
potential to debate and envision fundamental questions about the broad future trajectories that
a particular technology might take, who will benefit or be harmed by those trajectories, and
whether desired or unintended consequences will flow as a result. In addition, addressing
issues at an early enough stage lends out the hope that key decisions can be influenced, while
the polarization of opinion that often surrounds many controversial downstream issues is
likely to be avoided. That, at least, is the theory.
The test case, and a contributing impetus, for moving dialogue upstream is that of nano-
technologies3—the science and engineering of the very small. Nanotechnology involves the
fabrication, manipulation and control of materials at the atomic level. The term itself derives
from the unit of scale employed—with a nanometer being one billionth of a meter in length.
Nanotechnology is of intense interest to scientists and engineers because at sizes below 100
nm the fundamental chemical or electrical properties of materials can change. Although some
nanotechnology based products, as claimed by manufacturers, are already on the market (see
Woodrow Wilson, 2006), their real potential is predicted to lie in a range of fundamental new
advances over the next 10–50 years, in the domains of new materials, the environment, med-
icine and information technology. Alongside such hopes, nanotechnologies also raise a range
of potentially difficult safety and ethical concerns, all of which are surrounded by consider-
able uncertainty (Mnyusiwalla et al., 2003; Wood and Jones, 2003; Pidgeon and Rogers-
Hayden, 2007).
In this paper, we investigate the case of nanotechnologies through research into the out-
comes of the 2004 Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (RS/RAEng) inquiry
into the issue, using our analysis to also explore the notion of “upstream” public engagement.
When engagement is likely to be “upstream” is no simple matter to define in and of itself.
One working definition of “upstream” engagement might be as follows:
Dialogue and deliberation amongst affected parties about a potentially controversial
technological issue at an early stage of the research and development process and in
advance of significant applications or social controversy.
The RS/RAEng report (2004) argued that most developments in nanotechnologies are still
upstream in nature, in at least three senses: regarding investment decisions, impacts and
public awareness. First, many significant decisions which will affect the future trajectory of
nanotechnologies, particularly concerning research and development funding and infrastruc-
ture, have yet to be made. Second, many of the more radical impacts of nanotechnologies
have yet to be envisioned, remain hypothetical, or will depend upon its convergence with
other technologies. Third, in terms of public discourse, nanotechnologies have yet to gain any
major place in public or popular media representations in Britain (an observation also paral-
leled by research in the US: see Macoubrie, 2006).
While the term upstream engagement has gained currency in the UK in regard to public
deliberation, some of those who use it have noted the over-simplistic connotations it might
invoke (see e.g. Wilsdon et al., 2005). Upstream is often used in contrast to “downstream”
dialogue. The latter is typically held to occur too late in the technology development process
to have significant influence. What these shorthand terms then tend to imply are overly
simplistic, essentially linear trajectories for both technology and society. This renders largely
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invisible the processes of co-construction of technology with society which inevitably surround
any emerging technological field (e.g. Bjiker et al., 1974). The model of technology–society
relations implicit in upstream engagement is definitely not that of linear processes, or one that
simply involves the publics4 either at the “top” of a fixed stream or at the “bottom.” Rather,
technology and society can and do develop in a multitude of ways which are both dynamic
and mutually shaping (e.g. Rip et al., 1995). Upstream engagement can also be conceptual-
ized as a response to Collingridge’s (1992) dilemma, in that early on in the life of new tech-
nologies their impacts are often uncertain or concealed, whereas downstream (when impacts
and downsides become much clearer) effective control opportunities may be few or limited.
It is too early to state which nanotechnologies are likely to exhibit the properties that make
them difficult to control (such as technological entrenchment/inflexibility, long lead times,
and large scale), and many most likely will not. However, the theory at least is that by bring-
ing a wide set of perspectives to bear at an early stage, this will suggest areas that might prove
particularly problematic to control (Pidgeon, 1988).
Our analysis here of the notion of upstream public engagement suggests that the concept is
indeed an important innovation, and one that appears to reflect a genuine moment of change cur-
rently occurring in the relationship between science and wider society, particularly within the
UK. However, this analysis also suggests that the meaning of “upstream”—while itself a decep-
tively simple idea—is in reality a contested matter in both conceptual and practical terms, con-
taining a number of significant tensions and dilemmas of its own. In the final part of the paper
we therefore attempt to draw out some of the promises and perils of moving debate “upstream.”
2. Policy context in the UK and the RS/RAEng inquiry
When discussing the way in which the call for upstream public engagement has arisen at this
moment in time, and in the UK in particular, it is important to take account of the ways in
which UK science policy had been impacted by a recent history of controversy concerning
science, technology and risk. Above all, two issues have dominated the public policy agenda
and thinking. The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow”) crisis, as well as
the controversy over genetically modified (GM) crops, both occurring in the mid-to-late
1990s, marked a turning point in the way UK science policy was viewed. Both the Phillips
(2000) inquiry into the causes of BSE and a wider House of Lords Science and Technology
Committee (2000) report on Science and Society, argued that there existed a crisis of trust in
UK science policy-making.5 A contributory factor was assumed to be a failure of the tradi-
tional one-way “deficit model” of science communication, as implied in the earlier Bodmer
report (Royal Society, 1985) on science communication. In response, both reports stressed the
importance of openness in government and the science community as a precondition to re-
establishing credibility and trust in risk management and policy. The Lords report also high-
lighted a need to broaden the base of public consultation and dialogue on controversial
science policy issues (see also POST, 2001). The implication was that we need to move
beyond traditional public understanding of science efforts if we are to resolve some of the
most contested issues within contemporary science policy.
These policy developments, in the way the relationship between science and society is con-
ceptualized, must be seen within the context of changes in the governance of UK science more
generally. This reflects, in particular, a change from what Hagendijk and Irwin (2006) catego-
rize as “discretionary governance” to a more nuanced and fragmented approach, including that
of “deliberative governance.” Discretionary governance takes place with very little interaction
with the public, relying almost entirely on technical and other forms of expert advice and the
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UK has, in the past, generally organized science policy in this discretionary mode. According to
Hagendijk and Irwin, UK science policy has recently moved to a mixed-model incorporating a
range of forms of governance, including deliberative governance in which organized public
involvement responds to and in turn informs the political agenda for science.
While major dialogue and engagement processes have been used extensively in some
other European nations such as Denmark, the Netherlands or Switzerland (see e.g. Renn
et al., 1995; Joss, 1998), they have been less common in the UK. Consensus conferences had
occurred in 1994 for plant biotechnology (POST, 1995) and in 1999 for radioactive waste
management (UKCEED, 1999). The intense controversy over GM agriculture at the end of
the 1990s also led to a further major public engagement exercise on biotechnology in 2003,
the GM Nation? debate. This was an important experiment in multi-stage stakeholder engage-
ment, and yet failed to fully meet its objectives, in part because of organizational, financial
and political constraints (Horlick-Jones et al., 2007), but also because many of the partici-
pants in the open activities in the debate held firmly established positions prior to entering
into the exercise (see Pidgeon et al., 2005).
Against this background of intense controversy, a greater willingness to experiment with
engagement processes in the UK, and a concern that nanotechnologies might suffer the same
fate as GM food had earlier in the UK, the government approached the Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering to undertake its inquiry. Its remit was to “identify what health and
safety, environmental, ethical and societal implications or uncertainties may arise from the use
of the technologies, both current and future” (RS/RAEng, 2004: vii). The year-long process was
conducted by a working group and secretariat on behalf of the two academies, and its report
Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties was subsequently pub-
lished in July 2004. The government responded to this with its own Response to the Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering Report: Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies:
Opportunities and Uncertainties in early 2005.
The RS/RAEng working group sought both broad stakeholder and general public
involvement. The composition of the independent working group included not only Fellows
of both academies, drawn from the nanoscience and engineering communities, but also per-
spectives from social science, ethics, consumer protection and the environment.6 This broad
stakeholder involvement carried through into the inquiry process itself. The two academies
issued a call for written evidence, which was followed by oral evidence sessions and work-
shops. This included sessions for industry representatives, regulators, public engagement
specialists, civil society representatives, scientists and engineers, together with specialist
workshops on environmental impacts and implications and on the health impacts of nano-
technologies. The collection of evidence therefore created a significant additional resource on
nanotechnologies, with the evidence being placed on a website and included in the final report
as a compact disk (RS/RAEng, 2004).
Unusually, for a science policy document of the two academies, the inquiry group also
sought views of “ordinary members of the public” through both survey7 and qualitative work-
shop methodologies.8 It was expected, and found, that general public awareness of nanotech-
nologies would be extremely low, something likely to be the case with many upstream issues.
Accordingly, a representative survey was used to assess levels of awareness, supplemented by
two qualitative workshops used to elicit more elaborated understandings: the latter being used
to gauge how beliefs about nanotechnologies might become constructed in public discourse
in the future. These workshops were interactive, with the nature of nanotechnologies being
described alongside the presentation of scenarios, and with the opportunity to ask questions
of an “expert scientist” attending.9 Interestingly, the quantitative survey found relatively pos-
itive views (amongst those who were aware of and could provide a definition of the term),
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whilst the qualitative workshops were more mixed, with enthusiasm for benefits alongside
concerns about long-term risks and control of nanotechnologies, a methodological point to
which we return later.
In their final report, the academies made 21 wide-ranging recommendations addressing:
the industrial application of nanotechnologies; possible adverse health, safety and environ-
mental impacts; regulatory issues covering the classification of nanomaterials, the workplace,
consumer products and measurement; ensuring the responsible development of nanotechnolo-
gies; social and ethical issues; and stakeholder and public dialogue (RS/RAEng, 2004).
3. Research methodology
In the empirical research reported here, we study the impacts of the RS/RAEng nanotechnolo-
gies inquiry drawing upon a set of stakeholder interviews, conducted in the period immediately
after the publication of its final report at the end of July—specifically, from August 2004 to
January 2005. The broad aim of these interviews was to understand how the inquiry process, and
its recommendations, had been positioned by both individuals with an interest in the emerging
debate on nanotechnologies, and those involved in science communication and public engage-
ment more generally. Not only does this provide insight into some of the tensions and dilemmas
that surround different interpretations of the concept of “upstream public engagement,” in addi-
tion it also provided an opportunity to analyze understandings of an inquiry which can in itself
be positioned as “upstream,” in terms of both process and recommendations. We conducted 24
interviews with a range of stakeholders; including individuals who had worked on the RS/RAEng
inquiry group, others from nanoscience and nano-industry, as well as from science and technol-
ogy studies and science communication. We also interviewed representatives from civil society
groups and government. We have chosen to group interviewees into categories to help contextu-
alize their comments within their relationship to nanotechnologies and society yet maintain the
anonymity of those we spoke to (see Table 1 for a breakdown of interviewees). The majority of
individuals contacted readily agreed to be interviewed, and expressed interest in the project.
However, at the time of the fieldwork, a number of government representatives contacted stated
that they could not discuss the report with us because the government was at that time working
on its own response. As this has now been published (see HM Government, 2005) we refer to this
response to the RS/RAEng report in this paper as appropriate.
The semi-structured interviews lasted approximately an hour each, were held either in
person or by telephone, and were subsequently fully transcribed. Interviewees were first
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Table 1. Interviewees
Science, Nanoscience and Nano-industry 
(two are RS/RAEng Working Group members) 6
Civil Society groups 5
UK Science and Technology Studies 7
and Science Communication
US Science and Technology Studies 2
and Science Communication
Royal Society and Royal Academy 2
of Engineering Secretariat 
Government and Regulation 2
Total interviewees 24
invited to discuss the RS/RAEng processes, their prior expectations and subsequent impres-
sions of the report. Following this, the majority of the questions centered around the relation-
ship between nanoscience and society. Interviewees were also asked about their understanding
of the notion of dialogue with the publics on nanotechnologies, and a number of specific rec-
ommendations that we discuss in the paper that we see as having “upstream” potential.
4. Differing expectations/broadening input
Despite the general enthusiasm for early societal attention to nanotechnologies, as noted
above, the initial announcement that the RS/RAEng were to undertake the inquiry met with
mixed responses. To some interviewees, particularly those from the science and business
communities, involvement of the two academies represented both a way of opening up a
range of under-researched scientific questions (such as the toxicology of nanoscale air pollu-
tants) while also approaching the wider questions nanotechnologies raised in a relatively
impartial manner, grounded in current scientific understandings and the “facts” of the matter.
In particular, the involvement of the two academies was seen by these interviewees as an
opportunity to put the debate about nanotechnologies on a more “balanced” footing.
Interestingly, alongside the more dystopian visions of some critics, this was also thought nec-
essary with regard to some of the more speculative claims being made by the technology’s
more vocal advocates. For example:
I had always been concerned that nanotechnology was being significantly
over-hyped, that it was being misrepresented and that the reality was going to
fall far short of some of the hype so I was looking forward to basing the
report on hard scientific fact if you like, that removed a lot of the hype.
Interviewer: What would be examples of those?
I think it extends from the Drexler view of molecular manufacturing, sponta-
neous creation of materials, structures or devices through molecular assembly
as being just as far away from anything we knew physically at the time,
purely science fiction and also highly misleading, and because of the conno-
tations of life and self replication it added a dangerous edge to perception.
The other side is claims that it’s going to be a universal panacea. That it was
going to cure cancer, make computers the size of pinheads and so on.
(Nanoscientist and RS/RAEng Working Group member)
By contrast, other interviewees reported having initial concerns about the inquiry process,
something partly due to the reputation of government sponsored inquiries in general, and partly
due to the ways in which they viewed the past track records of the two academies. Regarding
the former issue, a body of academic literature exists critiquing the roles formal inquiries have
often played in the past. For example, it is argued that inquiries can sometimes perform solely
rhetorical functions, by providing legally non-binding advice at the same time as giving the
public the impression of review and control, while in effect postponing governmental action
and responsibility (Burton and Carlen, 1979). When formal inquiries are used to investigate a
controversial, or potentially controversial issue, it has also been suggested that they have at
times been carried out to “subdue” the voices of powerful pressure groups, particularly when
there is the possibility that these groups may threaten the continuation of officially condoned
activities. As such, they have been used at times in the past to portray continued opposition to
an issue as unreasonable (Doyle and McEachern, 2001).
350 Public Understanding of Science 16 (3) 
It has also been argued that official inquiries have been employed as a way of addressing
a multifaceted issue when a bureaucracy’s resources are stretched and to maximize opportu-
nities for a specific group of stakeholders (Ashforth, 1990), such as technology promoters or
investors. Moreover, inquiries have sometimes been structured in ways that, either explicitly
or implicitly, create obstacles to broader participation by constraining input and objections
(see Rogers-Hayden, 2004; Rogers-Hayden and Hindmarsh, 2002; Rogers-Hayden and
Jones, 2007; Walls et al., 2005). These critiques have focused on the (re)production of dom-
inant power/knowledge systems through the structure of inquiries. Hindmarsh, reflecting
upon Michel Foucault’s interpretations (for example, 1977), refers to such inquiries as “reg-
ulatory legitimisers” as these are used to both “manage” problem populations and secure
public trust and acceptance (Hindmarsh, 2003).
Accordingly, and echoing some of these critiques of inquiries more generally, there was
concern from other stakeholders, particularly those with a social science, science communica-
tion or civil society background, that the inquiry would be used to take nanotechnologies out
of public discourse: that is, serve as a means of pre-empting public debate and through this
avoiding controversy. One interviewee echoed a number of others’ comments when saying:
… it looked like it was an attempt by the political establishment, by particularly [Lord]
Sainsbury [Minister of Science] and all, to bury or to defer discussion on nanotechnol-
ogy … like a way that they could put off any kind of discussions and also of course it
looks like they were giving it to a trusted party i.e. a trusted party who would be expected
to say the things they want them to say and that’s from the history of the GM debate and
the way in which the Royal Society has spoken on things like nuclear power and so forth.
Yes, we were kind of expecting a political management of the issue rather than real dis-
cussion. (Civil Society member, interview, 2004)
The skepticism expressed by such interviewees also clearly related to the perceived histories
of the academies too. That is, as the quotation above suggests, that the choice of the acade-
mies to conduct the work was seen by some to send a clear signal about the findings the gov-
ernment was seeking and/or would get, from the inquiry. Despite the inquiry’s wider brief,
which specifically included investigating the ethical and societal implications related to nan-
otechnologies (RS/RAEng, 2004: vii), there was a concern about how the academies had
approached other controversial issues (e.g. nuclear power and genetically modified agricul-
ture) in the past. The academies were portrayed by such interviewees as typically approach-
ing the questions within a strictly science/progress frame. However, as noted above, the
RS/RAEng study group composition and inquiry process differed markedly from previous
inquiries undertaken by the Royal Society or Royal Academy of Engineering, as well as many
of those critiqued in the academic literature. As a representative of the academies stated:
it’s fair to say it’s an unusual working group and for good reasons; it’s an unusual pro-
ject. We don’t normally set out to look at the social and ethical issues in as much
detail as we would science. It might be a sideline. (Royal Society/Royal Academy of
Engineering representative)
Thus, a key difference in this inquiry was not just because the inquiry was occurring at the lead-
ing edge of research and development (which it undoubtedly was), as well as before public con-
troversy and significant applications of nanotechnologies had emerged, but also because it was
an important and successful collaboration between numerous stakeholders, in this way moving
beyond science and engineering to significantly broaden the range of expertise involved.
Extending the expertise of the group, in addition to broadening the debate about nan-
otechnologies within the inquiry itself, also acted to expand the discourse of nanotechnolo-
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gies into sectors that were not, or not very, engaged with it at that stage. For example,
although some civil society groups, such as the ETC group,10 had been working on nan-
otechnology issues for a number of years, Friends of the Earth (FoE) hadn’t been deeply
involved in the topic (Civil Society member, interview, 2004) and the UK’s National
Consumer Council hadn’t looked into nanotechnologies before the inquiry (Civil Society
member, interview, 2004). Thus the act of the inquiry in itself spurred learning of and engage-
ment in the issues amongst these civil society stakeholder groups. The stimulation of nan-
otechnologies discourse amongst relevant stakeholders is the key reason that the inquiry was
in itself positioned by many as “upstream”—and it is a point we will return to.
The broad range of expertise on the working group was significant not only in opening
up debate but also in getting the attention of a number of commentators about the uniqueness
of the process. It was one of the first “flags” a number of stakeholders saw as signifying a
change in the practices of the academies and consequently it meant a change in their expec-
tations of the inquiry. A number of interviewees who had voiced skepticism of the process
reported that, on learning of the range of expertise represented on the independent working
group, they had revised their initial expectations for the inquiry.
They [the academies] haven’t had a good track record looking at things from a more
public perspective so I was a little bit worried that this might be very much science ori-
entated and “these are going to have a lot of economic benefits” and “aren’t we great”,
“we are doing all this fab research” … but when I found out who was on the panel [work-
ing group] … I thought that’s okay. (UK Science Communicator, interview, 2004)
The working group, in being such a diverse group, was therefore seen as having the potential
to significantly broaden the framing of the issues under investigation (cf. Stirling, 2005). This
meant, in particular, paying early attention to potential social and ethical issues of nanotech-
nologies rather than merely seeing social and ethical issues as post-production “impacts,” a
point to which we return later. Reflecting on the publication of the report itself, most of our
interviewees who had originally been skeptical suggested that the actual outcomes had indeed
avoided a narrow framing, in a way that did appear to reflect the innovative composition of
the working group.
I think it was very much as good if not better than anyone could have expected from an
institution like the Royal Society … largely no doubt due to the fact that there was this
more broadly constituted group so I was very pleased with it, it’s an authoritative signif-
icant piece of work. (Civil Society member, interview, 2004)
Where points of criticism were expressed by such interviewees it was not with regard to the
report’s framing of the issues, but rather to the extent to which the report might have explored
some of the societal questions (e.g. regarding governance of nanotechnologies, future ethical
issues, or public “attitudes”) in greater depth than it ultimately did.
5. The contested notion of “upstream” dialogue
A central recommendation of the RS/RAEng report was that there should be an “adequately
funded public dialogue around the development of nanotechnologies” (RS/RAEng, 2004:
Stakeholder and Public Dialogue Recommendation 19). In its own response to the RS/RAEng
recommendation on dialogue, the UK government stated that “[t]he government agrees with
this recommendation and is committed to promoting constructive dialogue on nanotechnolo-
gies” (HM Government, 2005: 20). The government’s response also included an Annex
352 Public Understanding of Science 16 (3) 
describing principles for public dialogue on science and technology (POST, 2001). Significantly,
however, the word “upstream” does not appear in this response document, despite it being
stressed often in the RS/RAEng report.
The call for dialogue about science and technology is, of course, not unique: what is
unusual is the proposed timing of any such dialogue. Thus, it is significant that the RS/RAEng
recommend early debate but moreover that the RS/RAEng did this at a time when “upstream”
dialogue was still possible, a point we will return to. The general case for wider societal dia-
logue about novel technologies, and with it greater openness about science policy, rests upon
three broad sets of argument, which Fiorino (1990; see also Pidgeon, 1996; Stirling 2005)
characterized as normative, instrumental and substantive. The normative argument suggests
that dialogue is a good thing in and of itself, as one part of the process of resolving contro-
versial decisions. The belief is that, by making such decisions sensitive to the ethical and
value concerns of directly affected groups or populations a genuinely democratic approach to
the governance of science and technology, together with its risks, can be forged (Pidgeon,
1998). By the instrumental argument, dialogue is a means of bolstering the legitimacy of deci-
sions, and through this to enhance such things as trust in the policy-making process (Beierle
and Cayford, 2002). It is significant that it is precisely this justification that had dominated
many discussions of public engagement amongst the UK science policy community follow-
ing BSE (e.g. House of Lords, 2000). Finally, the substantive argument is that dialogue and
engagement, as part of a wider process of technology assessment, will help to generate better
quality outcomes. In particular, the US National Research Council report on Understanding
Risk (NRC, 1996) develops a detailed set of proposals for an “analytic-deliberative process,”
including extensive stakeholder engagement. This combines sound science and systematic
uncertainty analysis with deliberation by an appropriate representation of affected parties,
policymakers, and specialists in risk analysis. Such dialogue and deliberation should occur
throughout the process of risk characterization, from problem framing through to detailed risk
assessment and then on to risk management and decision implementation. Failure to attend to
dialogue at the early stages of problem framing can be particularly costly, for a key concern
may then be missing in subsequent analysis, potentially invalidating the whole process. This
core issue of decision framing and risk is central to the substantive case for dialogue around
upstream issues such as nanotechnologies (see Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007).
The RS/RAEng recommendation for dialogue was met with support from many of our
interviewees across the broad range of opinion sampled. For example:
I think this is probably the most significant area of the report, in the sense that, and I feel
this quite strongly, that all new technologies need public acceptance otherwise they just
won’t take off … It seems to me we have to get the public more informed, more involved.
(Nanoscientist and RS/RAEng Working Group member)
I think ultimately the long-term health of a nano-enabled society (I don’t know if that is
quite the right word) will depend upon the degree to which we get various stakeholder
and public groups engaged, talking about these issues … and another thing I think is
good, you [the RS/RAEng] are pretty clear with this report, you [the RS/RAEng] call it
upstream, we have a chance to change the model in which science and technology inter-
act with society. (US Science and Technology Studies academic, interview, 2004)
However, the contrast between the quotes above hints at a range of more fundamental under-
lying tensions, surrounding the question of what such engagement might ultimately be for and
the notion of “citizenship” included in the model of participation being assumed (Irwin, 2001;
Rayner, 2003; cf. also Toumey, 2006). In this respect a number of interviewees hotly
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contested the notion of “upstream engagement,” in particular expressing ambivalent attitudes
towards its purposes. This interviewee’s comments summed up a great deal of discussion on
the use and potential misuse of upstream debate on nanotechnologies.
I don’t really know whether [early engagement is] a good thing or a bad thing.
Sometimes I think it’s quite a bad thing because you are manipulating people by saying
now you’ve had the conversation about it so you’ve had your say and everything’s alright.
(UK Science and Technology Studies academic, interview, 2004)
As well as the possibility that engagement might circumscribe debate, upstreaming was seen
as potentially being used for democratizing technology, improving technology and for “get-
ting people on side” (mentioned both as a positive use and as a manipulation of dialogue by
various interviewees). This raises the possibility that early engagement could, in Stirling’s
(2005) terms, be used either to close down or open up debate, depending on how the dialogue
is constructed and the issues framed. In the following subsections we explore some of the
associated tensions and dilemmas.
Shaping science or public opinion?
One of the advantages of viewing nanotechnologies as an upstream issue is that it suggests
that lessons can be learned from the history of other controversial technological innovations
such as in biotechnology (see for example Mayer, 2002; Mehta, 2004; Grove-White et al.,
2004; Einsiedel and Goldenberg, 2005), civilian nuclear power (Flynn, 2003), the chemical
industries, or others that have held the potential for significant controversy (such as human
reproductive technologies). Mayer (2002), for example, suggests that by viewing the devel-
opment of major technologies as social processes, there are clear parallels to be drawn
between nanotechnologies today and the position that biotechnology faced in the 1980s. She
argues that similarities include the levels of extreme excitement and hype, a promise to con-
trol the future without critical consideration first of which futures are desirable and who might
control them, and debates narrowly framed about the issues of risk. Accordingly, advocates
of upstream engagement see its role as shaping a wide agenda—that of the dynamic of
science and technology itself. Hence, Wilsdon (2004; Wilsdon et al., 2005) argues that for
public engagement to be truly upstream it should invoke a range of questions that challenge
the agendas and practices of science itself, rather than solely the present or future representa-
tions that a society might hold about that science: “Why this technology? Why not another?
Who needs it? Who owns it? Who will benefit from it? Can they be trusted? Who will take
responsibility if things go wrong?”
The framing of nanotechnologies was mentioned by a number of our interviewees. The fol-
lowing quote stresses a perceived need to change the relationship between science and society,
proposing that nanotechnologies have arrived at a time when the traditional view of “public
understanding of science,” in which scientists were seen as the principal people qualified to
judge, or make decisions about, technologies would no longer be accepted by society. The inter-
viewee stressed that blanket assurances from scientists, in the sense of one-way communication,
would not work. “There’s no point in experts anymore standing up telling people there are no
dangers, they don’t believe them” (Nanoscience and Nano-industry member, interview, 2004).
However, a generally low level of public awareness about nanotechnologies, and the
introduction of nanotechnologies at a time when government and industry have become
acutely aware of the shortcomings of perceived (mis)management of earlier technologies,
such as agricultural GM, was also noted by many of the interviewees. Comments in particu-
lar mentioned the potential this combination held for science–society relationships. Early
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dialogue was also seen as a way of “getting in early” by a number of interviewees, not only
to open up genuine communication between science and society, but also by some as an
opportunity to “educate.” Paradoxically, undertaking public dialogue on nanotechnologies
while there is so little existing public knowledge of them was also seen to carry risks for the
field, expressed as a concern that “there is a danger in opening a dialogue that the media will
seize upon it and it will become alarmist” (Government/Regulator, interview, 2004). In this
sense, the claim was that while early public dialogue held the potential to shape the agenda
of public discourses, it might contribute to an amplification of concerns about risk, reinforced
through contemporary representations of nanotechnologies within science fiction (many of
which can be interpreted either favorably or unfavorably). The extent to which dialogue
processes do contribute to the social amplification or attenuation of risk perceptions for par-
ticipants is an important question, albeit one about which we know very little at present (for
one exception see Renn, 2003).
Public opinion about nanotechnologies was thus seen by some of our interviewees as still
open for formation. The opportunity for science to “get in first,” and “set the record straight,”
and in particular before popular scenarios became dominant in public discourse was men-
tioned by some interviewees. In this way the publics could be made aware of the “real” risks
and opportunities offered by nanotechnologies. Early public engagement was thus seen as
having both the advantage and disadvantage—depending on one’s viewpoint—of being used
to shape the emergent societal discourses about nanotechnologies and their acceptability.
Seen from a critical perspective then, enthusiasm for upstream engagement might simply be
replacing (but in effect does not supplant) the older style of science communication. That is,
possible objections to the technology might now be readily attributed to a deficit in public
engagement rather than a deficit in public knowledge (as the 1980s model of science com-
munication had supposed; critiqued in Irwin and Wynne, 1996), an elision with rather less
radical potential than might first appear. Hence:
… it’s a kind of deficit model again, a deficit model of public engagement—we’ll dia-
logue in order so that they understand us better and will agree with us, instead of we’ll
sit them down and educate them. Substitute the word dialogue for the word education but
with the expectation … you can read a lot of stuff where the expectation is that when the
dialogue is finished scientists can just carry on as normal. I’m sorry it doesn’t work like
that. If you have a dialogue then that means you are listening and you’re taking notes and
you’re changing as a consequence. As I say, I see absolutely no evidence that anybody
who I would call in serious authority or in charge has got any intention of doing any of
that whatsoever. (Civil Society member, interview, 2004)
Rayner (2004) identifies three deficit models in the development of contemporary science–
society relationships. The first, as described, being a perceived lack of understanding of the
science by the publics, the second being a change in rhetoric by science communicators while
they talk about two-way communication and still provide “information” to the publics, and the
third being a perceived deficit in “trust” in institutions by the publics. From this perspective the
perceived deficit in dialogue identified here could be seen as a fourth type of deficit model.
All of this sets a dilemma for the design and conduct of upstream engagement processes,
since it is hard to see how the goals of opening up the research agenda to more public scrutiny
on the one hand can be reconciled with a push to use engagement to shape public discourses on
the other. On a practical level the danger is that, as with the UK GM Nation? public debate which
occurred in 2003 (see Horlick-Jones et al., 2007), engagement will be compromised from the out-
set by incompatible objectives. Equally, either of these objectives—being broad in scope and
ambition—would seem difficult to attain through a program of public engagement alone.
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Impacts or interaction?
Our interviewees also highlighted that the role of nanotechnologies in the evolving debates
about the relationship between science and society is likely to be a contested issue. Some
interviewees thought that such debates shouldn’t be linked specifically to nanotechnologies,
while others suggested that linkage was helpful in so far as it brings some of the critical
science–society issues to the fore. In particular, nanotechnologies is not a single technology
but rather points, in the medium and longer term, to a convergence of technologies in ways
that might have profound societal consequences (for example, nanotechnologies with infor-
mation technology, biotechnology and cognitive science; see e.g. Roco and Bainbridge, 2003;
Wood and Jones, 2003: Nordmann, 2004). In this sense, a number of interviewees thought
discussion shouldn’t, or even can’t, be contained to the topic of nanotechnologies.
The debates we are having around nanotechnology are really around technology per se
and the fact that nanotech is such a broadly framed field itself encourages that. Some
people see that as a disadvantage … But for me, precisely because these debates are not
really about risk primarily, they are about the democratization of technology choice, then
it’s an advantage that the technology on which they are essentially focused is so dis-
parate. This helps to draw out the generic features, and highlight that the real debate is
about the governance of technology in general. So I think in that sense the issues go far
wider than nanotech and it’s right that they should. (UK Science and Technology Studies
academic, interview, 2004)
Nanotechnologies are thus seen as allowing a platform for public participation—as a neces-
sary change in governance to discuss wider issues of science–society interactions. The
RS/RAEng report itself recommended (2004: 87, Recommendation 21) “that the Chief
Scientific Advisor should establish a group that brings together representatives of a wide
range of stakeholders to look at new and emerging technologies and identify at the earliest
possible stage areas where potential health, safety, environmental, social, ethical and regula-
tory issues may arise and advise on how these might be addressed.” This recommendation
emerged within the inquiry as a response to concerns that the unintended impacts of devel-
opments in nanotechnologies, as part of wider technological dynamics, might be emergent
(that is, only recognizable at some unspecified future point in time), as well as a product of
currently unanticipated convergences of technology, and hence could only be debated
“upstream” if first identified through some form of ongoing reflective oversight. There was
considerable support for this recommendation amongst our interviewees, who also stressed
that this should be applied to a range of technologies; that is, it was not an issue confined to
nanotechnologies but encompassed a range of future developments.
I feel that nanotechnology is just the technology that we’re discussing today. Next year
it will be something else and it seems to be not really satisfactory just to be dealing with
hot topics when they arrive, it really should be something that the Government should be
doing as a matter of course. As long as it doesn’t become a talking shop. (Nanoscience
and Nano-industry member, interview, 2004)
In the government’s own response it stated that as part of its 10-year investment framework
for science and innovation it was creating a center of excellence in science and technology
horizon scanning to be based in the Office of Science and Technology and overseen by the
Chief Scientific Advisor, building in particular on existing foresight scanning capacity (HM
Government, 2005: 21). Whether the government’s own group meets the potential held out for
it, or falls somewhat short of this, as suggested by Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe (2005: 57),
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the recommendation does hold the potential to offer a catalyst for change, through a new more
open approach to the relationship between science and society. However, rather than look at
impacts on people from existing technologies, upstream technology assessment might address
more productively the interaction between new technologies and society (cf. Rip et al., 1995;
Einsiedel and Goldenberg, 2005). As one interviewee suggested:
Let me put in a plug for a simple word change … “Impact” is a difficult word. I think it’s
better to think of perhaps “interaction”. (US Science and Technology Studies academic,
interview, 2004)
It’s a small but significant word change from downstream social and ethical impacts to
upstream public interactions with the technologies. Without an emphasis on “interactions”
rather than “impacts,” the role of the publics in relation to nanotechnologies is always likely
to be confined to the “downstream” or post-production phase. This can be seen in the way
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI) is currently positioned in the US for the development
of the Human Genome Project, and is also, in turn, setting the intellectual and institutional
context for considering nanotechnologies in the US. The ELSI model, which has been cri-
tiqued for stimulating discussion rather than affecting policy development (Fisher, 2005), can
be seen as framing technologies as inevitable and autonomous, leaving no room for evalua-
tion of such impacts to affect the development of the technologies themselves (Macnaghten
et al., 2005). There has even been the development of a similar specific acronym for nan-
otechnologies—SEIN—societal and ethical impact of nanotechnologies (US Science and
Technology Studies academic, interview, 2004).
Taking the metaphor of interaction seriously means assessing the suitability of technolo-
gies for society rather than assuming that society passively accepts technologies which are
value and power neutral and thus “given.” What this might in turn open up is more explicit
analysis within participatory processes of the often hidden assumptions about the power rela-
tionships between technologies and society, by acknowledging that there are multiple paths
technologies could take/or could have taken that are not always visible (see Hill, 1998).
Upstream engagement, in this instance, may even provide a means of placing on the table top-
ics that typically remain outside of traditional discussions of the trajectory and conduct of
science: in particular the power relations a technology embodies, and the balance between
corporate and civil society interests and control.
Opening up science?
The theoretical position hinted at above, in which society is not simply impacted by tech-
nologies, but itself interacts with science and technology, enables one to view science–society
relationships as mutually constitutive. In this way science can be seen, like all knowledges, to
reflect its social and historical origins: the culture, politics and values of a society. Opening
up the “black box” of science to expose the values permeating it is a commonplace call within
science and technology studies (see Jasanoff, 2005; Leach et al., 2005) but less common in
the natural sciences. Upstreaming engagement, and with it a promise of an increase in gen-
uine science–society interaction, means that science and scientists learn from the publics as
much as citizens learn from science. In effect this represents a call for greater reflexivity
within science, in which scientists engage with whatever values underlie their work and what
values will be reproduced through their work.
The RS/RAEng report acknowledged that the case of nanotechnologies highlighted a
need to go beyond public dialogue: in effect to find ways to open up science itself.
Recommendation 17 states that:
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The consideration of ethical and social implications of advanced technologies (such as
nanotechnologies) should form part of the formal training of all research students and staff
working in these areas and, specifically, that this type of formal training should be listed
in the Joint Statement of the Research Councils’/AHRB’s Skills Training Requirements
for Research Students. (RS/RAEng, 2004: 87)
Part of the significance of this recommendation is that it also turns attention away from the
downstream entry or impacts of technologies within society, to the upstream visions for new
technologies as they are developed. Social and ethical issues are thus no longer post-product
add-ons but positioned as integral to the creation of new knowledge. The UK government sup-
ported this idea in principle, yet also suggested that mechanisms are already in place to
address this, through workshops, public debates, skills training and other activities which
could be developed further by the existing research community (HM Government, 2005).
Most of our own interviewees, however, interpreted this recommendation more broadly than
this. For example, the following interviewee, from the nanoscience community, suggested
that this type of discussion amongst scientists and science students would probably be most
welcome—and something not often undertaken in the physical sciences.
My guess is that young people would be quite interested and enthusiastic. I have to say
also that on the physical sciences side there has been less activity than in the biological
sciences because in the biological sciences we get these issues cropping up all the time
whether it’s GM or stem cells … On the physical sciences, there doesn’t seem to be, to
put it bluntly, not much of an ethical issue about a transistor so is there any need to deal
with, devote a lot of time to that area? My guess is probably not, but on the other hand
new technologies have an impact on society; who benefits from them, who owns them,
who controls them, who controls the development. I think there are issues in there which
certainly deserve exploring. (Nanoscience and Nano-industry member and RS/RAEng
Working Group member, interview, 2004)
In this passage the interviewee highlights the importance of scientists knowing some of the
social and ethical implications of the projects they are working on. Some in nanotechnology
industries do indeed see learning about public concerns and taking possible risks seriously as
a part of learning from what they see as the past “public relations disasters” of nuclear energy
and GM. Nanotechnologies are therefore seen to provide the opportunity to forge a different
relationship with citizens as the technologies develop (Physics Today, 2004). Yet the inter-
viewee quoted above also highlights deeper questions for scientists to explore about the social
context of technologies. Thus, rather than trying to just anticipate publics’ concerns and avoid
damaging publicity through knowledge about publics’ values, this approach demands a
stronger social awareness from scientists. Although most interviewees supported the idea of
moving the entry point of discussion on social and ethical implications further up the tech-
nology production process, there were some additional concerns expressed about potential
misuse of this approach (in addition to concerns about the level of support scientists would
get to achieve this, and demands on scientists’ time and energy). Many interviewees empha-
sized that the relationship between science and society was much broader than merely scien-
tists discussing the implications of technologies. In this way, rather than formal “training,” a
new approach to democratizing technology was needed, one enabling a greater reflexivity
within the sciences. One such experiment was carried out at the Interdisciplinary Research
Centre (IRC) at Cambridge University UK, partly influenced by the RS/RAEng inquiry. The
Centre employed Robert Doubleday, a sociologist with a chemistry background, to foster
activities explicitly bridging the science–society divide. Doubleday was involved in activities
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involving nanoscientists, stakeholders, and citizens.11 Of particular interest to this discussion
is that he is creating courses for nanoscience students which go beyond merely describing
public concerns about technologies but move towards a reflexivity in science by placing the
technologies within this social and historical context.
6. Concluding considerations: the perils and promise of upstream?
I’m certain it [upstream dialogue] is not the panacea that some folks see it as being. (UK
Science and Technology Studies researcher,12 interview, 2004)
The upstreaming of debate on nanotechnologies will not provide all of the answers to
science–society relationships, but it does provide the opportunity to try something different,
through creating an early entry point for public dialogue. The RS/RAEng inquiry that we have
analyzed here provided an insight into the potential upstream dialogue holds, through engaging
a wide range of stakeholders in discussion (the reason the RS/RAEng was positioned as
“upstream” by commentators), and recommending further potential pathways for upstreaming
the relationship between science and society (in their explicit and implicit notions of upstream).
There does seem to be widespread support for broad engagement on the issues surround-
ing nanotechnologies: RS/RAEng (2004) clearly recommended this; the government agreed
with this recommendation; and a number of such processes are currently taking place in the
UK. However, exploring multiple perspectives on nanotechnologies through early engagement
doesn’t necessarily mean that controversy will be avoided or even that this should be/is a goal
of early engagement. Upstream dialogue shouldn’t recreate a new deficit model, in which
objections to aspects of new technologies are seen as occurring, no longer from a lack of public
understanding of science, but from a lack of early public engagement. Indeed, upstream dia-
logue may even lead to even greater differences of opinion than seen with downstream issues,
as debate revolves around (possibly incommensurable) visions for the future of society when
technologies are still being conceived. Moreover, early dialogue also raises the question, not
only of the goals of debate, but of how the relationship between participation and policy out-
comes might operate. Evidence with traditional forms of public participation suggests that this
can quickly lead to anger and stakeholder fatigue if they do not appear to be linked to policy
consideration (Rayner, 2003). Additionally, as Rayner also points out, establishing a linkage
between deliberative processes and policy outcomes is inevitably difficult at the best of times
and moving debate upstream is unlikely to make this situation any easier.
Further, as yet unaddressed questions, include the implications of dialogue when there
are so few products, scenarios and examples to discuss, and so much remains hypothesis. For
example, is it impractical, or even necessary, to spend time entertaining Drexlerian imaginar-
ies and visions? Equally, as discussion of nanotechnologies is likely to be based on future
developments with essentially unknown consequences, upstream debate becomes dialogue
with even greater uncertainties and indeterminacy. It may be not only impossible to predict
outcomes but also impossible to know what we don’t know about nanotechnologies (see
Deville and Harding, 1997; also Wynne, 1992). Can this contribute to a situation in which
opening up early debate creates an “issue” by simply amplifying perceived risks (see Pidgeon
and Rogers-Hayden, 2007)? This may well be unlikely on the basis of engagement processes
alone, as research on the social amplification of risks tends to suggest that this rarely depends
upon any single factor operating alone, but upon the combined impacts of a range of factors
accumulating over time—such as the balance of perceived benefits and risks between indi-
viduals, the private and the public sectors; analogies drawn with other (both stigmatized or
accepted) technologies; the existence of significant scientific dispute; and attribution of blame
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for prominent accidents were these to occur; alongside significant media coverage and inter-
est group attention (Pidgeon et al., 2003; Kasperson and Kasperson, 2005). As an example of
the last, in their article “When Nano-Pants Attack” the journal Wired (2005) described
Chicago activists walking into an Eddie Bauer store and taking off their clothes in the store-
front window. They “aimed to expose more than skin: Activists hoped to lay bare growing
allegations of the toxic dangers of nanotechnology.” Painted on their bodies were messages
such as “Eddie Bauer hazard” and “Expose the truth about nanotech,” as the company has
been seen to recently embrace nanotechnology with its line of stain-resistant “nanopants.”
The general low awareness of nanotechnologies does, however, raise (at least two) spe-
cific methodological problems likely to be common to many upstream engagement contexts.
First, because research methodologies for eliciting the views and values of dialogue partici-
pants are not necessarily neutral instruments, a problem that is likely to be magnified in
upstream contexts where prior awareness is low. We can compare the rather different quanti-
tative and qualitative findings found by the RS/RAEng. Their survey approach presents a rel-
atively positive picture of current British public opinion on nanotechnologies,13 while the
workshops were far more mixed. In social science terms, both approaches have strengths and
limitations of course, although one can argue that there are good grounds to place particular
emphasis upon the qualitative findings, not least because they are the product of a more delib-
erative exchange by the participants. However, the fact remains that selection of research
methods might have a significant influence upon the data collected and hence the conclusions
reached from any upstream engagement process.
The second methodological problem arises because, under circumstances of low prior
awareness and knowledge, the provision of good quality information to dialogue participants
will be critical. In one sense this begins to map out some of the design parameters for
upstream engagement processes, or at least to rule out some methodologies and sampling
strategies in advance. However, one danger here is that debate may be inadvertently framed
by the organizers in a particular way; for example stressing the positions of perhaps only one,
or a limited set of voices to the debate. Equally, even in a citizen jury type format, where par-
ticipants are (in principle) free to select their own evidence and witnesses, some prior fram-
ing will be necessary to initiate the engagement process. All of this will be particularly
difficult where the basic “facts” of the matter are also contested by the different sectional
interests (industry, non-governmental organizations, government etc.), something that is
likely when an issue is highly uncertain and upstream.
What this does mean is that the framing of nanotechnologies is yet to come. With the
push for early engagement gaining popularity there also needs to be a parallel call for well-
documented case studies. Amidst all of the current enthusiasm we urgently need further
research on which dialogue processes might work (and will not work!) in the upstream phase
of a technology’s development. We certainly cannot assume that downstream techniques can
readily transfer to the inherently more uncertain and turbulent world of upstream technology
assessment and public deliberation. Such approaches may mean thinking beyond “dialogue”
with the publics. It may mean involving a wider group of people/stakeholders in emerging
technology assessment such as civil society, and science/industry/academia (rather than just
government) and opening up the black box of science through ethics training for scientists. In
this way, upstream engagement may well mean far more than just early public debate at a
point prior to polarized opinions or significant research and development. Rather, it will
involve an ongoing cycle14 of dialogue among affected parties. Therefore, the agenda will
need to move from industry product based debate (found in downstream dialogue) to broader
framing of the issues. This will involve unpacking the assumptions that go into science along-
side exploring how technologies fit in with the forms of society that citizens wish to have.
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Thus ideally debating visions all parties have for society and how the technologies
can/should/could and cannot be developed to fit within these. This path of deliberating soci-
etal visions and assumptions may even lead to exploring some more radical ways of
approaching the interaction of citizens and science that have yet to be conceptualized. In the
wake of the GM and BSE affairs in Europe, nanotechnologies may well have arrived at a time
where there is a genuine opportunity to try something different. What is clear is that:
… there is an opportunity now which there won’t be in three or four years time and prob-
ably wasn’t three or four years ago to ask quite deep questions about new technology
development trajectories … in the UK it will be because the memories of the GM debate
will fade, the furore will fade and so [will] the willingness of decision makers to take on
board new lessons, new ways of working, new ways of thinking about things, lessons about
technologies, society and interaction … It’s a political opening not a technological one
although it does coincide with a technological one. (Civil Society member, interview, 2004)
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Notes
1 While stakeholder engagement refers to dialogue with specialized communities involved with nanotechnology, be
they civil society, academia or government, public debate refers to dialogue with individuals or groups beyond
these specialized communities: see Schiappa (1989).
2 We are choosing to use the words “engagement,” “debate” and “dialogue” interchangeably throughout the paper
to reduce repetition. 
3 It is something of a misnomer to refer to nanotechnology in the singular as the term encompasses such a wide vari-
ety of applications. For this reason we will be referring to the plural nanotechnologies throughout the paper where
practical.
4 In line with STS (Science and Technology Studies) convention we are using the plural of the public—“publics.”
The intention is to acknowledge that there are multiple identities and standpoints within society, and hence not just
one public perspective or voice on this issue.
5 The question of whether a crisis of trust in science actually existed at this point in time is debatable. At the level of
general beliefs about the contribution of science and technology to society, public attitudes have remained highly favor-
able in the UK (see OST/Wellcome, 2000; OST/MORI, 2005). Where concerns are expressed it is with respect to much
more specific controversial issues (radioactive waste, GM food, the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine).
6 In particular, among the 15 members were Onora O’Neill an ethicist from the University of Cambridge, Deirdre
Hutton from the UK National Consumer Council, the environmentalist and Chair of the UK Sustainable
Development Commission Jonathon Porritt, and Nick Pidgeon as social scientist.
7 The survey is not included in the processes we are referring to when we suggest that the RS/RAEng was positioned
as “upstream” by commentators, as this was primarily an information gathering process rather than an engagement
process.
8 Following the successful precedent set with the nanotechnologies inquiry, a subsequent Royal Society (2005)
report on pharmacogenetics also elicited public views, in collaboration with the organization’s “Science and
Society” program.
9 The scientist’s role was confined to providing basic information on what nanotechnology was, scenarios of possi-
ble developments in nanotechnology, and then to be “on hand” to answer questions raised by the group.
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10 See ETC, http://www.etcgroup.org
11 For example Doubleday was also involved in Nano Jury UK—the first citizens’ jury on nanotechnology.
12 This interviewee preferred to be called a researcher rather than an academic.
13 A similar finding for the United States is reported in Sims-Bainbridge (2002).
14 For a discussion on types and timing of dialogue in an engagement cycle see Jackson et al. (2005).
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